THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Domestic Relations-Alimony-Assignment of Past Due Alimony-[Minnesota].
-After an absolute divorce, the defendant's wife obtained a decree for alimony in
gross, payable in instalments over a period of three years. She assigned the unpaid balance to the plaintiff after it became due. Hed, the balance unpaid and past due was
assignable and could be recovered from the divorced husband by the assignee. Cederberg v. GCnstrom, 258 N.W. 574 (Minn. 1935).
Alimony, originating in connection with the limited divorce of the English ecclesiastical courts as money ordered to be paid periodically by the husband to his wife for her
support, was not a debt due her, but simply her right to demand support, subject to the
control of, and modification by, the court. See Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 420, 221
S.W. io66, io68 (1920); Otway v. Otway, 2 Phill. log (1813). In England, the term alimony has been confined to its original meaning, but in America it has been extended to
include payments after absolute, as well as limited, divorce, whether for the maintenance of wife or children or payable in one commuted amount. Watkins v. Watkins,
[1896] L. R. P. Div. 222; Cohn
a. Cotn,
i"o Cal. 99, 88 Pac. 267 (xgo6); Bassett v.
Waters, 1o3 Kan. 853, 176 Pac. 663 (igi8); Welles v. Brown, 226 Mich. 657, 198 N.W.
18o (1924); Cf. West V. West, 241 Mich. 679, 227 N.W. 924 (1928). In determining assignability, however, courts in both countries have applied the same principles. There
is no doubt that the English property settlements and secured annuities are assignable. Madurcan v. Maclurcan, 77 L.T.R. 474 (i897). In this country, decrees having
the same characteristics of finality, not subject to modification, and awarding a certain
amount in lieu of such claims as support and dower, have been held assignable, payment being either future or past due. Bassett v. Waters, 1O3 Kan. 853, 176 Pac. 663
(1918); Meissner v. Bergman, ii Ohio C. C. 539 (1896). Past due instalments of main-

tenance money after absolute divorce have also been considered assignable. See Watkins v. Watkins, [1896] L. R. P. Div. 222, 228; Procter v. Curchin, 273 N.Y.S. 821
(1934). Likewise, even a decree for a total amount of alimony pendente lite periodically
payable but past due may be assigned. Lynham v. Hufty, 44 App. D.C. 589 (i916). Instalments of maintenance money not yet due, however, have been held non-assignable.
In re Robinson, 27 Ch.D. 16o (x884); Welles v. Brown, 226 Mich. 657, 198 N.W. 18o
(1924); Kempster v. Evans, 81 Wis. 247, 51 N.W. 327 (1892).
So it appears that where the decree provides for an award of money, usually in
instalments and payable indefinitely, which the court may modify and which it intends strictly as a current means of support and a measure of a standard of living,
there is a disposition to hold that the wife may not make an assignment that might
lead to her or the children's becoming a public charge or a burden upon the divorced
husband beyond the amount decreed. In re Robinson, 27 Ch.D. 16o (1884); Watkins v. Watkins, [i896] L.R.P. Div. 222; Welles v. Brown, 226 Mich. 657, 198 N.W.
,8o (1924); Kempster v. Evans, 81 Wis. 247, 51 N.W. 327 (1892); see Fournier v.
Clutton, 146 Mich. 298, 300,

1O9

N.W. 425, 426 (19o6); Restatement, Contracts,

§ 547 (1933). A policy against permitting realization in the present of speculative estimates and possibilities of rights which may never arise is also shown in
the refusal to sanction agreements in which the wife has promised another, usually
her divorce attorney, that he shall have a percentage of whatever amount she may
obtain from her defendant husband. McConnell v. McConnell, 98 Ark. 193, 136 S.W.
931 (1911); Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N.J. Eq. 736, 52 AUt. 694 (1902); Jordan v. Westerman, 62 Mich. 170, 28 N.W. 826 (1886); Rogers v. Daniel, 92 Okla. 47, 217 Pac.

RECENT CASES
881 (1923). But where the money obtained by the wife is in the nature of a property settlement or division and she alone is interested, whether payment is to be
made at one time or in instalments as in the instant case, or where instalments of support or maintenance money have become due, the courts do not concern themselves
with the future support of the wife and so find no objection to assignment. Madurcan
v. Madurcan,77 L.T.R. 474 (1897); LYnkan v. Huefty, 44 App. D.C. 589 (I916); Bassett
v. Waters, IO3 Kan. 853, 176 Pac. 663 (I918); Procterv. Curchin, 273 N.Y.S. 821 (1934);
Meissner v. Bergman, Ii Ohio C. C. 539 (1896).

Personal Property-Safety Deposit Boxes-Garnishment-Relation between Customer and Bank-[Minnesota].-A Minnesota statute provided that a garnishee must
disclose the property of the defendant in his possession or control. 2 Mason's Minn.
Stat. §§ 9358, 9360 (1927). The defendant rented a safety deposit box from garnishee
bank under a contract stipulating that the parties did not contemplate a bailment.
The box could be opened only by the simultaneous use of two keys, one in possession
of the garnishee, the other in possession of the rentor. Held, the contents were not in
the possession or control of the garnishee. Wells v. Cole, 260 N.W. 520 (Minn. 1935).
The relationship between the safety deposit company and the customer has
been subsumed under three conventional categories: (1) Bailment. Mayer v. Brensinger, 18o Ill. 110, 54 N.E. I59 (1899); Morgan v. Citizen's Bank, 19o N.C. 209, 129
S.E. 585 (1925); West Cache Sugar Co. v. Hendrickson, 56 Utah 327, I9o Pac. 946
(1920). Courts have frequently accepted this view and permitted garnishment of the
contents. State ex rel. Rabiste v. Southern, 300 Mo. 417, 254 S.W. 166 (1923); Tillinghast v. Johnson, 34 R.I. 136, 82 Atl. 788 (1912). This classification appears to be erroneous because a transfer of possession is necessary for bailment and the safety deposit box transaction, for reasons given below, does not involve a transfer of possession.
(2) Landlord and tenant. DuPont v. Moore, 86 N.H. 259, 166 At. 417 (1933); People
ex rel. Glynn v. Mercantile Safe Deposit Co., 159 App. Div. 98, 143 N.Y.S. 849 (1913)
(where box could be opened without cooperation of the bank). The relationship of the
parties seems equally inconsistent with this concept. The parties do not contemplate a
transfer of an interest in land and possession of the leased premises is not transferred
for the term of the lease. See Morgan v. Citizen's Bank, Igo N.C. 209, 212, 129 S.E.
585, 587 (1925). The tenancy and bailment views, it might be noted, are neither inconsistent nor mutually exclusive. A conceivable theory is that there was a lease of the
space in which the contents were to be placed plus a bailment of the contents. But the
difficulty of finding the transfer of possession necessary for bailment is as great in this
situation as in that where only bailment is contemplated. (3) Licensor and licensee.
This classification has been no more than suggested. See National Bank v. Stead, 232
U.S. 58, 68 (1913); II Minn. L. Rev. 440, 445 (1927).
Although courts have deemed it essential to force the safety deposit relationship
into one of the conventional categories, the real problem raised by the garnishment
cases is one of statutory construction which generally involves a determination of
whether or not the bank is in possession of the contents of the safety deposit box.
While there is no universally accepted definition of de facto possession, three elements are common to all definitions: (i) an intent to exclude others from the res;
(2) a power to deal with the res; and (3) a power to exclude others from so dealing

